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Abstract
The aim of  this paper is to determine Iceland’s foreign policy options in relation 
to shelter theory. Iceland has been seeking political and economic shelter 
ever since the United States deserted it in 2006, by closing its military base, 
and in 2008, by refusing to provide it with assistance following its economic 
collapse. Iceland has made several new security and defence arrangements with 
its neighbouring states, applied for membership of  the European Union and 
was the first European country to make a free-trade agreement with China. 
Moreover, the president of  Iceland pressed for closer political and economic 
ties with Russia. Prominent Icelandic politicians frequently claim that Brexit 
will create a number of  opportunities for Iceland and lead to closer cooperation 
with Britain. However, Iceland has not yet secured shelter of  an extent 
comparable to what it had enjoyed from the United States. In this paper, we 
will answer questions such as: What does shelter theory tell us about Iceland’s 
overseas relations with the US, NATO, the EU, Britain, Russia, China, and the 
Nordic states? Will Iceland receive more reliable shelter provided by multilateral 
organizations than by a single shelter provider?
Keywords: Foreign policy; small states; shelter theory; Iceland.
Introduction
Iceland has been searching for shelter ever since the US closed its military base in the 
country in 2006 and refused to provide it with a rescue package following the 2008 
economic crash. As the American military presence had been a central component of  
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Iceland’s political shelter, it vehemently opposed the United States’ intended closure of  
the base, never backing down from the steadfast position that a US military presence 
was needed in the country. Until 2006, the US was also deeply involved in the provision 
of  economic shelter to Iceland, as it continued to pay for Iceland’s defence, and had also 
built and run the international airport at Keflavík, the air surveillance system, and other 
infrastructure. Moreover, until the late 1960s, the US provided Iceland with direct eco-
nomic assistance – especially in times of  economic downturn. Iceland therefore turned 
to the US for financial assistance when the country was hit by the 2008 international fi-
nancial crisis, which had caused an almost complete collapse of  its financial system. The 
Icelandic Central Bank approached the US Federal Reserve and requested a currency 
swap agreement, similar to that which the Federal Reserve had offered Switzerland, the 
other Nordic countries, and many other countries around the globe. However, in this 
instance, the United States rejected Iceland’s request for financial support. 
To compensate for diminishing American political and economic shelter, Iceland has 
sought shelter from alternative sources. The aim of  this paper is to examine what shelter 
theory can tell us about Iceland’s foreign policy and its relations with the US, NATO, 
the EU, Britain, the Nordic states, Russia and China. Can they provide Iceland with 
economic and political shelter? 
According to the shelter theory, small states’ vulnerabilities can be categorized as 
being of  three types: political, economic and societal. Accordingly, small states are de-
pendent on the economic, political, and societal shelter provided by larger states and/
or regional and international organizations. The importance of  shelter is related to three 
interrelated features: reduction of  risk in the face of  a possible crisis event, help in ab-
sorbing shocks during a crisis situation and assistance in dealing with the aftermath of  
the crisis (Thorhallsson 2010, 2011). Shelter theory draws on the International Relations 
literature and Small State Studies and their common claim that, in international relations, 
small states are in a need of  an alliance or a protecting power in order to survive and 
prosper (Keohane 1969; Archer & Nugent 2001). However, the shelter theory claims 
that small states do not solely seek security protection to safeguard their autonomy, as 
realists argue (Waltz 1979); they also seek to alleviate the structural weaknesses that ac-
company smallness, such as a small domestic market and a small public administration 
(Thorhallsson 2010, 2011). This paper will focus on the political and economic compo-
nents of  the shelter theory and leave aside the societal aspects in order to provide a more 
thorough analysis of  Iceland’s search for political and economic shelter.
The Icelandic government has been searching for shelter and has made civil secu-
rity agreements – mainly concerning its waters – with the United Kingdom, Denmark, 
Norway, and Canada since the closure of  the US military base. Airspace surveillance ar-
rangements made with various NATO member states, including France, Germany, and 
the UK, and the non-NATO Nordic states Sweden and Finland, allow for the temporary 
presence of  their jet fighters in the country. Alongside its pursuit of  new bilateral agree-
ments, Iceland has sought to strengthen its ties with NATO in an effort to shore up the 




Iceland also began to consider new avenues for economic shelter. In 2009, it applied 
for membership of  the European Union just nine months after its economic collapse 
and engaged in accession negotiations until 2013. After a speedy economic recovery, 
considerable domestic opposition to membership and a change of  government, the 
application was put on hold. At present, at the request of  the Icelandic government 
from 2015, Iceland is not regard as a candidate country to join the EU, though it has not 
withdrawn its membership application. 
Icelandic politicians have also looked to non-traditional sources for support – name-
ly China and Russia. Iceland was the first European country to sign a free trade agree-
ment with China, which entered into force in 2014, and it cooperates with China on a 
number of  issues. Furthermore, the former president of  Iceland (1996-2016), Ólafur 
Ragnar Grímsson, enthusiastically campaigned for closer political and economic ties 
with Russia. Also, at the height of  the 2008 economic crisis, Icelandic policy-makers 
were willing to entertain the possibility of  a Russian rescue package. Moreover, in the 
autumn of  2015, Iceland stopped taking part in the EU’s foreign policy declarations 
concerning the US/EU-led sanctions on Russia in order to develop closer relations with 
Russia, even though it still implements the sanctions. However, Icelandic-Chinese rela-
tions have not taken off  in term of  providing shelter for Iceland and Icelandic-Russian 
relations are constrained by the tension between Russia and Iceland’s allies in NATO 
and the EU/EEA. 
Furthermore, Iceland’s efforts to seek economic and political shelter provided by the 
Nordic states intensified with the US withdrawal and has been extended to security and 
defence. On the other hand, the Nordic states are too weak to be able to provide Iceland 
with political and economic shelter in times of  crisis, both in terms of  resources and 
their reliance on their larger European neighbouring states. 
Thus, Iceland has not yet secured the same degree of  shelter as it used to receive 
from the USA. Most recently, prominent Icelandic politicians have been looking at how 
a post-Brexit environment may benefit the country. The minister for foreign affairs plans 
to establish closer political and economic ties with the United Kingdom. For instance, 
his master plan is to follow its lead and engage in free trade worldwide, thus strengthen-
ing Iceland’s economy. Also, Iceland’s security and defence could benefit from a greater 
UK presence in the North Atlantic and its emphasis on a stronger NATO. Accordingly, 
Iceland is still searching for shelter a decade after the US ceased to provide it.  
The paper is divided into eight sections, including an introduction and a conclusion. 
The second section places Iceland in the literature of  small state studies and presents the 
shelter theory. The third section examines Icelandic-US relations, Iceland’s membership 
of  NATO and the country’s new security and defence arrangements. The fourth sec-
tion analyses Iceland’s search for shelter within the European project. The fifth section 
focuses on Iceland’s relations with the Nordic states and Nordic cooperation. The sixth 
section examines Iceland’s relations with Russia and China. The penultimate section 
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1. Small states in the international system: The shelter theory 
Small states have inbuilt structural vulnerability related to their smallness; this manifests 
itself  in, for example, a small domestic market, limited defence capacity and a small 
foreign service (Archer & Nugent 2001). Accordingly, what distinguishes small states 
from large states is their lack of  capabilities (Keohane 1969). The more successful states 
have developed certain domestic features such as democratic corporatism in order to 
cope with their smallness (Katzenstein 1984, 1985). They have also sought external 
protection. Their non-alignment may, at times, keep them out of  war, but it can also 
place them at the mercy of  larger states. Basically, small states survive due to their larger 
neighbouring states’ willingness to respect their independence. For instance, Vital (1967) 
argues that small states cannot withstand stress due to their more limited resources as 
compared with larger states. Hence, in a historical context, the Benelux states have either 
depended on large states for their defences or their willingness to accept their neutrality. 
Their prosperity is also associated with the economic success of  their larger neighbours 
and the willingness of  the latter to grant them access to their more extensive markets. 
Accordingly, a small state can make domestic arrangements in order to compensate for 
it weaknesses, but there are limits to what it can do on its own. A small state also needs 
an external protector, i.e. a state that will provide it with shelter. 
Shelter theory distinguishes between three forms of  shelter: political, economic 
and societal. Political shelter takes the form of  direct and visible diplomatic or mili-
tary backing, as well as other strategic coverage at any given time of  need provided by 
another state or an international organization, and/or organizational rules and norms. 
Economic shelter can take the form of  direct economic assistance, a currency union, 
help from an external financial authority, beneficial loans, favourable market access, a 
common market, etc., all of  which are provided by a more powerful country or by an 
international organization (Thorhallsson 2010, 2011). Societal shelter corresponds with 
Rokkan and Urwin’s (1983) historical account on the importance of  cultural features in 
centre-periphery relations. They argue that cultural transactions, in terms of  a transfer 
of  messages, norms, lifestyles, ideologies, myths, and ritual systems, are important in 
constructing centre-periphery relations. 
On the other hand, protection often comes at a certain cost. For instance, Vital (1967, 
79) argues that ‘where the quest for protection and insurance is successful a price must 
normally be paid in terms of  sacrifice of  autonomy in the control of  national resources 
and loss of  freedom of  political manoeuvre and choice’. For instance, international 
financial institutions’ aid is often given with preconditions regarding states’ domestic 
policies, and NATO shelter may carry considerable costs related to the application of  
its structure (Bailes & Thorhallsson 2013). One state’s dominance over another may 
include severe economic, political, and societal costs, as is shown by numerous historical 
examples. However, most – if  not all – small states have sought shelter from their larger 
neighbouring states and/or regional or international organizations. For instance, most 
small European states have opted for shelter provided by regional multilateral organiza-




the European Economic Area (EEA). The four smallest states in Europe, in terms of  
population, (Liechtenstein, Andorra, Monaco and San Marino) are mainly provided with 
shelter by their larger neighbouring states. Also, Iceland chose to seek shelter from its 
larger neighbouring state, the United States, and continued to enjoy considerable societal 
shelter from its Nordic neighbours in the post-war period (Thorhallsson & Steinsson 
2017). 
2. A small state seeking shelter in the past and present security 
environment 
Iceland has gained substantial political shelter from the US and NATO. By joining 
NATO in 1949 and signing a sweeping agreement regarding defence, trade, and eco-
nomic assistance with the US in 1941 and a bilateral defence agreement in 1951, Iceland 
firmly aligned itself  with the West, protecting itself  against what the Icelandic ruling 
class saw as external (German and Soviet) and internal (Icelandic socialist) threats. In 
addition to this military shelter, the US provided Iceland with extensive diplomatic back-
ing, as it negotiated favourable trade agreements for Iceland and allowed Iceland to 
circumvent the rules of  international organizations. The proliferation of  international 
organizations, as well as international laws and norms, protected Iceland. With US back-
ing, it was able to avoid many of  the costs associated with compliance with international 
rules and norms. Iceland’s strategic importance to the US gave the island sufficient lever-
age in order to win against a leading world power at the time, Britain, in each of  the four 
Cod Wars (Thorhallsson & Steinsson 2017). 
The US also provided Iceland with extensive economic shelter from early 1941 to 
2006. The British and American occupations in the Second World War proved to be 
economic blessings for Iceland, as the occupiers injected money into the economy. This 
positioned Iceland as one of  the wealthiest nations in the world by the end of  the war. 
Iceland was heavily dependent on US economic assistance until 1960. It received the 
largest Marshall aid package per capita of  any recipient and what amounted to almost a 
second Marshall aid package from the US in the late 1950s (Ingimundarson 1996). US 
aid was followed by US interventions in the Organization for European Economic Co-
operation (OEEC), the IMF, and the World Bank which allowed Iceland to circumvent 
the rules of  membership and the criteria for loans (Thorhallsson & Steinsson 2017). 
Moreover, the US remained deeply involved in the provision of  economic shelter to 
Iceland, as it continued to pay for Iceland’s defence, as well as building and running the 
international airport at Keflavík, the air surveillance system, and other infrastructure 
until the closure of  its military base in the country in 2006.  
Importantly, the bilateral defence agreement between the countries from 1951 is still 
in place. In service to it, the US regularly sends jet fighters for airspace surveillance with-
in the NATO framework and takes part in military exercises in Iceland. Interestingly, in 
2016, the US Department of  Defense and the Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs is-
sued a reminder about their security alliance, stating: ‘The DoD and MFA reaffirm their 
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shortly after Iceland confirmed its continuing participation in the US/EU-led sanctions 
against Russia in response to its destabilisation of  Ukraine (IMFA & DoD 2016). 
In the absence of  a US military base and permanent presence of  its jet fighters 
for airspace surveillance, Iceland began to shift towards finding shelter elsewhere. This 
changing focus included both bilateral and multilateral aspects. Thus, since the closure 
of  the US military base, Iceland has made civil security arrangements, mainly concerning 
its waters, with Britain, Denmark, Norway and Canada. The aim of  the regular meetings 
with these states is to exchange information, discuss common security concerns and 
plan various projects regarding training and military exercises (Sveinsson 2015). Also, 
arrangements have been made concerning airspace surveillance with various NATO 
member states, such as France, Germany, and Britain (Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2017) 
and the non-NATO Nordic states, Sweden and Finland, allowing the temporary pres-
ence of  their jet fighters in the country (Viðskiptablaðið 2014). 
In another substantive sense, Iceland turned to a multilateral organisation, NATO, 
thus demonstrating another option available to a small state according to the small state 
literature. Of  importance is its participation in the NATO Infrastructure Fund (Sver-
risdóttir 2007), as well as remaining committed to operations in Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, 
and elsewhere (US Embassy in Iceland 2007a). The release of  the country’s first-ever 
defence budget, and its offering to cover all substantial costs for military exercises in 
the region, emphasised that Iceland was increasing its own contribution in an effort to 
retain political shelter (US Embassy in Iceland 2007b). This notable change in emphasis 
can be understood as signalling a transition from a passive foreign policy to an active 
one, even though changes in world affairs, and the resulting direction of  foreign policy, 
had been noted as early as 1995 (Corgan 2002, 205; Thorhallsson 2006a). Also, in the 
spring of  2017, Iceland hosted ‘Dynamic Mongoose 2017’, a large NATO-led Subma-
rine Surveillance Exercise (NATO 2017), an indication of  NATO’s refocusing on the 
North Atlantic.
With the decline in its geopolitical importance, Iceland could no longer rely on the 
threat of  Russia to keep the Americans close. It is important to note that, while Iceland 
was at no point under imminent military threat, there was a persistent drive to seek political 
shelter after 2006, suggesting that it was Iceland’s own self-perception, rather than any ex-
ternal need, that compelled it to look for shelter elsewhere (see, e.g., Thorhallsson 2006b). 
However, substantial costs can also be associated with political shelter. For instance, 
Iceland was pressed by the US to continue to participate in US/EU-led sanctions against 
Russia. In the summer months of  2015, the Icelandic government considered a with-
drawal of  its support for the sanctions due to the Russian counter-sanctions against 
Iceland, which involved high costs for the nation’s economy. In 2014, exports of  marine 
products to Russia accounted for around 10 per cent of  all marine exports. Neverthe-
less, the government backtracked on its consideration to withdraw its support for the 
sanctions. The decisive factor was Iceland’s alignment with the US and the EU. Iceland’s 
dependency on the US and NATO for defence and on trade with the EU outweighed its 




Furthermore, the good relations between Iceland and the US have not prevented 
the latter from placing diplomatic sanctions against the former for engaging in com-
mercial whaling. These diplomatic sanctions, which were first set in place in 2004, have 
had several implications for the bilateral relations between the countries. Official visits 
by US ministers and high-ranking officials are restricted and US officials commonly 
criticise Iceland for its whaling policy at bilateral meetings and in multilateral forums. 
For instance, the US did not invite Iceland to take part in the 2014 global conference 
‘Our Ocean’, which was attended by 90 states, and no US Secretary of  State has visited 
Iceland since 2008. Moreover, the US has considered imposing targeted trade sanc-
tions against Iceland for its commercial whaling but has stopped short of  putting this 
into practice. Officially, the Icelandic government maintains that the diplomatic sanc-
tions have had very little effect on the countries’ relations (Sveinsson 2016). However, a 
high-ranking Icelandic diplomat claims that this is not true, that the sanctions have had 
greater consequences than were anticipated and have seriously damaged the relationship 
between the two countries, stressing that they would work together much more closely 
if  it were not for the sanctions (High-ranking Icelandic Official in the Ministry for For-
eign Affairs, interview, November 2015). Nevertheless, since the closure of  the military 
base, Iceland’s greater strategic importance in the North Atlantic (as regards the opening 
of  the Arctic Ocean) has led to increased high-level contacts between the two govern-
ments, even though the countries’ relations are nowhere near as close as they used to be.
3. Iceland’s quest to shelter provided by the European project 
In the summer of  2009, nine months after the country’s economic collapse, Iceland 
applied for EU membership. This was supposed to secure a safe haven and guarantee 
a quick economic recovery. The Social Democratic Alliance (SDA), which initiated the 
application, made the adoption of  the Euro its main selling point after a dramatic de-
cline in the value of  Iceland’s own currency, emphasising the benefits of  cheaper goods 
for consumers and enterprises and access to aid from the EU structural funds for rural 
areas, agriculture and the tourist industry. Its coalition member in government, the Left 
Green Movement (LGM), reluctantly accepted the membership application, in view of  
its opposition to membership of  the EU, in order to secure the creation of  the first left-
wing government in Iceland. On the other hand, all the main political parties in Iceland 
(including the LGM) softened their stance towards the question of  membership of  the 
EU in the wake of  the economic crash and were willing, in one way or other, to enter-
tain the possibility of  receiving shelter from the EU. For instance, in January 2009, the 
Progressive Party adopted a new European policy in favour of  membership of  the EU 
and the Independence Party advocated unilateral adoption of  the euro in the general 
election in April (see, for instance, Thorhallsson & Rebhan 2011).
However, the EU membership application was soon side-lined by the Icesave dis-
pute, which dominated Icelandic politics until the end of  the parliamentary term in 
2013 and triggered a nationalist backlash and greater Euroscepticism on the part of  the 
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difficult to ‘sell’ to the Icelandic public (Thorhallsson & Rebhan 2011). In spring 2013, 
the first act of  the newly formed coalition government, consisting of  the centre-right 
Independence Party and the centre-agrarian Progressive Party, was to put the EU acces-
sion negotiations on hold.
The Independence Party, the Progressive Party and the Left Green Movement claim 
that full participation in the European project would have a devastating effect on the 
primary sectors. Also, the EU project is seen as putting constraints on Iceland’s eco-
nomic policy: adopting the euro would be fatal to the economy, putting constraints on 
businesses, restricting world trade, threatening the authority of  domestic institutions, 
diminishing sovereignty and undermining the uniqueness of  the nation and its identity 
(Thorhallsson & Rebhan 2011). On the other hand, from 2013 the Left Green Move-
ment has been in favour of  holding a referendum on whether or not to continue the 
accession process. 
Opponents of  EU membership point to Iceland’s economic prosperity since the 
mid-1990s and argue that living standards have risen enormously, this being partly or 
mainly because of  the country’s status as a non-member of  the EU. They point to the 
fact that the government and the Central Bank have been able to form their own eco-
nomic and monetary policy without EU interference and the fact that Iceland recovered 
relatively quickly from the 2008 economic crash and, at present, has one of  the highest 
economic growth rates in Europe (Thorhallsson & Rebhan 2011; IMF 2016). 
Despite this hostility towards EU membership or the potential cost of  membership, 
Icelandic governments have nonetheless been forced to accept some of  the constraints 
associated with participation in the European project. Iceland joined EEA, EFTA and 
Schengen because non-membership would have threatened its key economic interests in 
the case of  EEA and EFTA, and imposed burdens on Icelandic individuals in the case 
of  Schengen. EEA and EFTA membership entailed access to EU markets, including 
those for marine and agricultural products, without adverse effects for these sectors. 
When indisputable economic interests clash with the sovereignty and nationalism dis-
course, the economic interests prevail. One could say that Iceland has been able to get 
away with its ambivalence through the willingness of  the European Union to grant it 
access to the Common Market without sacrificing its protectionism in the agrarian and 
fisheries sectors.
In 1970, Iceland joined EFTA in order to take part in the EFTA member states’ free-
trade agreement with the European Economic Community (EEC), which was signed 
two years later. The free-trade agreement with the EEC was highly beneficial for the 
fishing industry and the country did not start to consider other alternatives until Spain 
and Portugal (important markets for Icelandic marine exports) joined the EU (for in-
stance, see Thorhallsson 2004). Membership of  EFTA was very costly for the local 
manufacturing industry but at the same time modernized it and prepared it for increased 
external competition. Accordingly, Iceland’s partial engagement with Europe during this 
period provided important economic cover according to the shelter theory. In 1961, the 




the British, Danish, Norwegian and Irish EEC membership applications. However, it 
concluded that its economy was not ready for membership (it was underdeveloped and 
still characterized by high tariff  and non-tariff  barriers to trade) (Thorhallsson 2004).
In the mid-1990s, Iceland joined the EEA and decided to participate in the Schengen 
scheme to secure the continuation of  the Nordic passport union. Membership of  the 
EEA is generally regarded as highly beneficial for the country. Also, Icelanders have 
benefited from free movement, access to higher education within the EU and participa-
tion in the Union’s research funds. Membership of  Schengen has secured the continu-
ation of  easy access to the other Nordic states and, importantly, participation in police 
collaboration in Europe. Hence, the EEA and Schengen Agreements provide important 
economic and political cover (in terms of  security cooperation) according to the shelter 
theory. 
However, the Icelandic government failed to take notice of  the implications of  the 
free flow of  capital and did not adopt the necessary measures (which it could have done, 
according to the EEA Agreement, and which Norway did) to restrict its scope and the 
expansion of  the financial sector. These factors contributed to the 2008 economic crash. 
Also, importantly, the structure of  these agreements, and in particular the EEA Agree-
ment, does not grant Iceland access to the EU institutions (the Council of  Ministers, 
the European Parliament and the European Council). The absence of  Icelandic repre-
sentatives within the EEA decision-making processes has created a reactive approach in 
implementing the EEA rules, with Icelandic authorities simply applying them, though 
they do not necessarily reflect conditions in Iceland. For instance, the rules might fail 
to reflect Iceland’s small size and the limited budget it has available to defend its finan-
cial sector (Prime Minister’s Office 2010). Hence, Iceland is not a member of  the club, 
which may be very costly. For instance, before, during and after the 2008 economic 
crash, the Icelandic government repeatedly sought assistance from the European Cen-
tral Bank and the European Union, but found their doors closed against it. Moreover, 
the European Union stood firmly by its member states, Britain and the Netherlands, 
in their dispute with Iceland over the Icesave debt. Accordingly, membership of  the 
EEA provides neither political shelter (in terms of  diplomatic and defence assistance) 
nor economic shelter (in terms of  external assistance before, in and after an economic 
crisis). Also, membership of  the EEA and Schengen involves adopting the protector’s 
rules and norms (Bailes & Thorhallsson 2013).
Thus, Iceland’s engagement in the European project provides a mixed picture in 
terms of  our shelter theory. Membership of  EFTA, the EEA and the Schengen scheme 
are largely beneficial and provide a partial economic shelter and some political shelter 
(within Schengen). However, these can be highly costly if  Iceland does not look out 
for its own interests and, for instance, the Icelandic community does not benefit from 
participation in the Structural Funds. Also, Iceland is not a member of  the club and, 
thus, the EU does not provide the country with essential political and economic backing 
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4. The partial political and economic shelter provided by the  
Nordic states
The Nordic Council was formed in 1953 as a forum for Nordic parliaments and gov-
ernments to cooperate on common Nordic affairs. It should be emphasised that from 
the outset, the Nordic Council has focused on matters of  law, social issues, economics, 
culture, science, education and transport, while side-lining, until recently, matters of  
defence and foreign policy (Thorsteinsson 1992a, 425). The failure of  the Nordic states 
to create a Nordic Common Market and a Scandinavian Defence Union relates, on the 
one hand, to the size of  the Nordic states’ markets, since the cost of  creating such an 
agreement would have outweighed the benefits, and on the other to their limited defence 
capabilities as compared with their larger neighbouring states. However, Nordic cooper-
ation has provided Iceland with partial political shelter, in terms of  diplomatic backing, 
as well as in terms of  providing security shelter after the country lost its comprehensive 
American political shelter, as already discussed. 
According to Bailes and Ólafsson (2014, 10), ‘the significance of  changing Icelandic 
approaches to security since 2006 lies not least in the way they have fostered a com-
mon language and common approaches between the country and its Nordic neighbours, 
who remain the most congenial available partners in political and cultural terms, and 
who – following a declaration in April 2011 – are now committed to offer mutual aid in 
all non-military emergencies – according to the ‘Nordic solidarity clause.’ In 2009, the 
Nordic states established Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO). NORDEFCO 
involves joint exercises and activities, and the sharing of  best practices. It is in part in-
tended to share costs across the Nordic states. NORDEFCO has reportedly been suc-
cessful in undertaking joint activities (Saxi 2013). Within NORDEFCO, the Icelandic 
Coast Guard (ICG) cooperates with the other Nordic states on procurement, education 
and training, but Iceland is not involved in the military aspects of  the organization (Saxi 
2011, 28-29, 73).
The Icelandic Coast Guard operates the NATO Iceland Air Defence System, and in 
this connection it cooperates closely with NATO and its member states. The ICG’s main 
collaborating partner is the Royal Danish Navy. This collaboration is based on bilateral 
agreements and has a bearing on most of  the ICG activities on a daily basis. The ICG 
regards itself  as capable of  dealing with its day-to-day wide-ranging obligations but as 
being in need of  backup from its external counterparts in major crisis situations such 
as major shipwrecks, oil spills and national disasters. Assistance would most likely come 
first and foremost from the Danish Navy, then the Norwegian Coast Guard and the 
other members of  the Arctic Coast Guard Forum (Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, 
Russia, Canada and the US). However, the ICG relies on information from external 
authorities (mainly Denmark and NATO) concerning traffic, at sea and in the air, in 
Iceland’s area of  responsibility on a daily basis (High-ranking Officials of  the Icelandic 
Coast Guard, interviews 16 May 2017).
The solidarity clause between the Nordic states against non-traditional threats en-




operation is explicitly cited as an essential element of  Iceland’s cyber security policy 
(Ministry of  the Interior 2015). Iceland set up a Computer Security Incident Response 
Team (CERT-IS), which had previously been implemented in the other Nordic states 
(Ministry of  Foreign Affairs 2009; Ragnarsson & Bailes 2010, 194). Since the establish-
ment of  CERT-IS, it has cooperated extensively with similar units in the other Nordic 
countries in sharing information about cyber threats, defence methods and equipment 
(CERT-IS 2014, 13; 2015, 10-12; 2016, 3-4, 10). 
Iceland has been provided with wide-ranging diplomatic support (political shelter) 
by the Nordic states. For example, Iceland’s cooperation with the Nordic states, and 
also the Baltic States since the early 1990s, in the World Bank Group and the IMF has 
granted it a role within these institutions. Hence, Iceland has appointed representatives 
to serve on the governing bodies of  the World Bank Group through the membership 
of  the Nordic and the Baltic states. It has also chaired the delegations of  these states to 
the IMF (Central Bank of  Iceland 2005). 
Moreover, the Nordic EU member states helped Iceland to secure membership of  
the Schengen scheme on better terms than they received in the negotiations leading to 
the signature of  the EEA Agreement (Eiríksson 2004). Also, the Nordic states have 
provided Iceland with extensive administrative assistance within EFTA and the EEA 
frameworks (for example, see Benediktsson 2003; Thorhallsson 2004).
Nordic cooperation has also provided Iceland with economic shelter in connection 
with the common Nordic labour market and burden sharing, and, at times, regarding 
participation in European integration. Moreover, Iceland implemented the Scandinavian 
welfare model and law making, which were the founding pillars of  the post-war society 
(for instance, see Jónsson 2001). The Nordic states cooperate extensively on social af-
fairs, allowing Icelanders to take up employment and settle down across borders, travel 
without passports, and claim social security on the same basis as the nationals of  the 
state in which they are living. 
In 1982, the agreement on the Nordic labour market was extended to Iceland; this 
ensures that Icelanders are able to take up employment and settle in the other Nordic 
countries without conditions (Arter 2008, 298). This proved to be highly important for 
Icelanders, and more generally for the Icelandic economy, in the aftermath of  the 2008 
economic crash. Icelanders moved to the other Nordic states in large numbers in search 
of  employment, thus easing the pressure on the Icelandic labour market and the state’s 
central budget during a difficult period. After a few years during which yearly popula-
tion growth stayed above 2.5 per cent, the 2008 crisis caused a 0.5 per cent population 
reduction in 2009 and stagnation in 2010 and 2011 (Ministry of  Welfare 2012, 8). This 
pattern is similar to the economic contraction of  the 1960s (Ministry of  Welfare 2012, 
20-22). Data for 1971-2011 shows that approximately three-quarters of  all emigrating 
Icelanders departed for Sweden, Denmark or Norway (Ministry of  Welfare 2012, 24), 
with the latter being a particularly attractive destination after the 2008 crisis (Ministry of  
Welfare 2012, 25). 
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Iceland’s economic transition and adaptation to participation in European integration. 
For instance, during the negotiations on Iceland’s accession to EFTA, the Nordic EFTA 
member states met Iceland’s demands, set up an industrial development fund for the 
island, and took measures to make it easier for Iceland to export lamb to their markets 
(Benediktsson 2000, 83-94; see four main targets by EFTA-committee (EFTA-nefndin) 
1969). 
Moreover, one could say that Norway paid the bulk of  Iceland’s entrance fee to the 
European market. The EEA and Norway Grants comprise the contributions made by 
the EFTA/EEA states. In the period 2009-2014, Norway provided 95.8 per cent, Ice-
land 3.0 per cent and Lichtenstein 1.2 per cent of  the €993 million set aside for the EEA 
Grants. In addition, Norway alone financed special Norway Grants, which amounted 
to approximately €804 million in this period (EEA Grants 2017). From the beginning, 
Norway has provided approximately 95-97 per cent of  the EEA Grants (Institute of  
International Affairs 2014). At present, Norway makes significant net contributions to 
the EU through its membership of  the EEA. Iceland is actually a net beneficiary: it re-
ceives more from the EU than it pays into it, while Switzerland pays slightly more to the 
EU than it receives in return (Bruegel 2016). Moreover, Norway pays most of  the cost 
associated with the running of  the EEA Agreement (the EFTA secretariat in Brussels, 
the European Surveillance Authority, and the EFTA Court) (Institute of  International 
Affairs 2014).
The relationship between Iceland and the other Nordic states before, at the height 
of, and in the aftermath of  the 2008 economic crash in Iceland sufficiently demonstrates 
the lack of  comprehensive economic shelter provided by the Nordic states. However, 
they were more willing than other states to provide partial economic and diplomatic 
shelter to Iceland. 
Before the crisis hit, the Nordic states provided Iceland with partial economic shelter, 
which came with strict conditions. Also, importantly, they provided Iceland with loans 
which were part of  the IMF rescue package; without these loans it would have proved 
even harder for Iceland to receive the IMF assistance. However, when the Icelandic 
government failed to implement the Nordic states’ conditions and Britain and the Neth-
erlands blocked IMF assistance to Iceland, the Nordic states participated in this blocking 
action. Their close economic and political ties to both Britain and the Netherlands, as 
well as their relations with the EU, proved to be more valuable than their relations with 
Iceland (Thorhallsson & Kirby 2012). Prominent Icelandic politicians characterized the 
involvement of  the Nordic states in different ways. The President of  Iceland harshly 
criticized them for not coming to Iceland’s defence during the Icesave dispute (Morgun-
blaðið 2010). This reaction bore similarities to Icelandic politicians’ condemnation of  
Nordic cooperation during the Cod Wars when the Nordic states were deemed insuf-
ficiently supportive of  the Icelandic cause (Jóhannesson 2005, 20-21, 33, 84). However, 
at the same time, the Icelandic Foreign Minister described Nordic participation in the 




5. Iceland’s reach out to Russia and China for shelter
Icelandic policymakers have always given priority to good relations with Russia, and 
trade between the two countries has been extensive at times, despite Iceland’s status as a 
founding and fully-committed member of  NATO. At present, Iceland and Russia have 
a good bilateral relationship even though Iceland implements the US/EU-led sanctions 
on Russia over the Ukraine crisis, and Russia has imposed counter-sanctions on Iceland. 
For instance, the countries have an agreement on cooperation on Arctic affairs (Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs November 2011) and work closely together in the Arctic Council. A 
high-ranking Russian official (interview, December 2016) claims that the Russian gov-
ernment very much appreciates its cooperation with Iceland in the Arctic Council. 
Furthermore, during his time in office (1996-2016), Iceland’s president, Ólafur Rag-
nar Grímsson enthusiastically campaigned for closer political and economic ties with 
Russia. He gave priority to maintaining close cooperation with Russia over Arctic issues, 
and made a special effort to retain friendly ties between the two states following Rus-
sia’s breach of  Ukraine’s sovereignty (Thorhallsson 2017). For instance, at the Arctic 
Dialogue (now High North Dialogue) in Norway in 2014, Grímsson railed against a 
Norwegian minister for bringing up the conflict in Ukraine and criticizing Russia for its 
involvement. The Icelandic President claimed that ‘it would only take us (members of  
the Arctic Council) less than an hour to ruin the cooperation in the Arctic Council if  
we were to discuss all conflicts and biggest world events within its framework. … We 
have to be careful not to divide states in the Arctic into different groups’ (Ólafsson 19 
March 2014). Moreover, in the International Arctic Forum in Arkhangelsk, the current 
presidents of  Iceland, Russia and Finland discussed the economic developments in the 
Arctic, the importance of  protecting the Arctic environment and the role of  the Trump 
administration in such matters (Arctic Portal 2017). 
At the height of  the 2008 economic crisis, the Icelandic Central Bank hinted that the 
Russian Government was willing to bail Iceland out with a substantial loan and Icelan-
dic policy-makers were willing to entertain the possibility of  a Russian rescue package. 
The US ambassador in Reykjavik was clearly concerned about this prospect, reporting 
to Washington that ‘...the (Icelandic) PM asked at the press conference why Iceland 
shouldn’t call on the Russians if  they could help.’ (US Embassy in Reykjavik 2008). The 
ambassador also claimed that the embassy had encouraged the Icelandic government 
to look for shelter elsewhere other than from Russia: ‘We doubt that it would be in the 
interest of  the U.S. or NATO for the Icelanders to be beholden to Russia, however 
“friendly” the loan terms may be.’ (US Embassy in Reykjavik 2008). Notably, the ambas-
sador also encouraged Washington to consider stepping in and offering assistance: ‘The 
possibility of  a Russian loan bailout as well as concerns voiced by some American bank-
ers raise the question of  whether greater USG involvement in the crisis is merited’ (US 
Embassy in Reykjavik 2008). The response from Washington, however, was not posi-
tive. The US offered no financial assistance, and Washington officials simply expressed 
relief  when the Russian government hinted that it was willing to bail out Iceland after 
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Russian loan offer, the interesting fact remains that Icelandic policy-makers were willing 
to entertain the possibility of  a Russian rescue package.
In 2015, the Icelandic government seriously considered withdrawing its support for 
the US/EU-led sanctions against Russia after Russia imposed counter-sanctions against 
Iceland. However, it backtracked on the consideration. The decisive factor was Iceland’s 
alignment with the US and the EU, as already stated. On the other hand, in an interesting 
political twist, Iceland stopped taking part in the EU’s declarations on the extension and 
amendment of  the sanctions in the autumn of  2015 (Thorhallsson & Gunnarsson 2017).
Iceland has taken part in EU’s foreign-policy declarations since joining the EEA. 
Its alignment with the EU’s foreign policy is regulated through statements on political 
dialogue made by governments of  the EU and EFTA countries in connection with the 
signature of  the EEA Agreement (Althingi 1993). For instance, in 2014, Iceland aligned 
itself  with 35 out of  36 EU foreign-policy declarations (European Council 2014-16). 
Until June 2015, Iceland took part in all EU’s foreign-policy declarations on the sanc-
tions against Russia. However, in October 2015, Iceland disappeared from the list of  
third countries aligned with the EU’s decisions to renew the existing sanctions. Iceland 
is nowhere to be found on the list of  aligned countries from that time. Accordingly, 
in 2015, Iceland did not take part in two EU declarations concerning the sanctions. In 
2016, Iceland did not take part in any of  the six EU declarations about the sanctions. 
Altogether, in 2015 Iceland aligned itself  with 22 out of  33 EU foreign-policy declara-
tions. In 2016, Iceland took part in 24 out of  33 declarations (European Council 2014-
16). The Ministry of  Foreign Affairs claims that the abstention from participation in the 
EU’s foreign policy declaration was the outcome of  a closer consideration of  whether 
or not to take part in the EU’s declarations. In early 2015, the Icelandic government had 
announced that it no longer regarded itself  as a candidate country to join the EU. On 
the other hand, the main reason stated for non-alignment with the declarations was one 
of  time constraints: the EU does not give Iceland enough time to respond to invita-
tions to align itself  with it decisions (High-Ranking Official in the Icelandic Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs, interview, January 2017). The EU simply invites Iceland to take part in 
its foreign-policy declarations without prior political dialogue (High-Ranking Official 
in the Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs, interview, December 2016). On the other 
hand, the decision not to take part in the declarations concerning the sanctions on Rus-
sia was a deliberate one intended to keep good relations with Russia, and an attempt to 
have Russia lift its counter-sanctions on Iceland even though the country still applied the 
US/EU-led sanctions against it. Accordingly, Iceland keeps a lower international profile 
about its participation in the sanctions, and the international media no longer report that 
Iceland has aligned itself  with the EU’s sanctions. Importantly, Iceland has managed to 
maintain good relations with Russia even though the countries have adopted sanctions 
against each other. According to a high-ranking Russian official, ‘Iceland was not sov-
ereign and not independent in its decision-making’ when it decided to take part in the 
US-EU lead sanctions on Russia. ‘Iceland had to play the game of  the United States’ 




Iceland has significantly extended its cooperation with China. For instance, it was the 
first European country to sign a free-trade agreement with China, which entered into 
force in 2014. This covers trade in goods and services, rules of  origin, trade facilitation, 
intellectual property rights, competition and investment. The free-trade agreement also 
stipulates that the two states should enhance their co-operation in a number of  areas, 
including on labour and environmental issues (Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2013). Also, 
the countries cooperate on geothermal energy (Iceland abroad n.d.) and have signed a 
number of  other cooperation agreements relating to the Arctic, such as cooperation on 
oil exploration in the Dreki area (National Energy Agency 2014) and a Memorandum of  
Understanding on Cooperation in the field of  Marine and Polar Science (Government 
of  the People’s Republic of  China and Government of  Iceland 2013), and the Icelandic 
shipping company Eimskip is having two new vessels built in China, both designed for 
the North Atlantic (Eimskip 2017). Moreover, Iceland cooperates with China with the 
Nordic states under the umbrella of  the Nordic Council of  Ministers and other Sino-
Nordic frameworks (Nordic Council of  Ministers 2017).
Moreover, Iceland was a firm supporter of  an observer status for China in the Arc-
tic Council – the main body for Arctic Governance. Iceland has chosen an inclusive 
approach within the Arctic Council in order to strengthen the multilateral framework 
of  decision-making in the Council. Hence, Iceland has welcomed observer status for a 
number of  global actors, such as China and the EU, not only to raise their interests in 
Iceland but also to balance the more powerful members of  the Arctic Council, namely 
the USA and Russia (Bailes et al. 2014, 84).
6. A quest for shelter provided by a powerful neighbour in a post-
Brexit world
The Icelandic Minister for Foreign Affairs has seized the opportunity for Iceland to 
develop closer political and economic relations with the United Kingdom following its 
decision to leave the European Union. There have been frequent contacts at ministerial 
and administrative levels between the Icelandic and the British government since the 
Brexit referendum. Both countries seem to be eager to establish closer relations in the 
light of  the coming post-Brexit world (see Thorhallsson & Gunnarsson forthcoming).
Many prominent Icelandic politicians are sympathetic towards Brexiteers and fre-
quently talk about opportunities for Iceland associated with Britain’s departure from 
the European Union. According to the Foreign Minister, Þórðarsson, Brexit – and the 
associated opportunities it may provide – has become a priority issue in the Icelandic 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The minister hopes that the UK, as the fifth-largest world 
economy, will become the leader of  free trade in the world after it leaves the EU. This in 
turn might allow Iceland – as the UK’s neighbouring state and established trade partner 
– to utilize this opportunity and engage in free trade worldwide, thus strengthening its 
economy (Thorhallsson & Gunnarsson forthcoming).
Importantly, the minister has taken the lead within the European Free Trade As-
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other hand, Norway and Switzerland have been sceptical about Britain’s re-entry and 
worry that it would change the power balance within the organization and possibly lead 
to disputes with the EU (Thorhallsson & Gunnarsson forthcoming).
According to the Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Brexit will not have any ef-
fect on the security and defence relations between Iceland and the UK. However, the 
UK is likely to campaign for a stronger NATO in the post-Brexit era, and in the light of  
growing disputes between the West and Russia, might seek to strengthen its security and 
defence ties with Iceland – a move that would be welcomed by most of  the Icelandic 
political elite. Iceland’s security and defence would benefit from greater levels of  activity 
by the Royal Navy (RN) and Royal Air Force (RAF) in the North Atlantic. Also, Ice-
landic decision-makers have pointed to the possibility of  strengthening North Atlantic 
cooperation amongst Iceland’s closest neighbouring states and entities in the post-Brexit 
world (Thorhallsson & Gunnarsson forthcoming). 
Associated difficulties for Iceland following Britain departure from the EEA have 
been set aside in the public political discourse of  most Icelandic politicians. On the other 
hand, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and individual foreign ministers have increasingly 
focused on the importance of  reaching a deal with the UK in order to prevent a deterio-
ration in the countries’ relations and guarantee Iceland’s interests after the departure of  
the UK from the EU and the EEA. At present, the countries enjoy close relations but 
have in the past engaged in difficult disputes over fishing rights in the North Atlantic 
and the Icesave dispute. Iceland also had to face tough British negotiating teams during 
its EFTA and EEA accession talks (Thorhallsson & Gunnarsson forthcoming). Moreo-
ver, the UK withdrawal from the EU will complicate negotiations in the North Atlantic 
such as regarding fishing rights and marine environmental protection. These issues are 
of  fundamental importance for Iceland. For instance, in the wake of  the Brexit negotia-
tions, Britain has decided to withdraw from the London Fisheries Convention of  1964 
which allows countries to fish near each other’s coasts (McHugh 2 July 2017). Hence, 
Iceland has a challenging time ahead in securing shelter from the United Kingdom in 
the post-Brexit era.
7. Conclusion
The limited defence and security capacity in Iceland, the closure of  the US military base 
in the country in 2006 and the 2008 economic crash demonstrate that the country lacks 
political and economic shelter. In the years between 2006 to 2009, Iceland began seeking 
shelter both from its historical allies and from new potential shelter providers. 
First, Iceland tried to preserve remnants of  the political shelter provided by the US 
and to resuscitate the economic shelter provided by the US in deep economic down-
turns. Also, Iceland deepened its involvement in NATO and started to look closer at 
Nordic cooperation as a form of  political and economic shelter.
Second, Iceland sought shelter through new venues of  cooperation. It sought com-
prehensive shelter as provided by full participation in the European project and enter-




ministers have been looking into the possibility of  aligning Iceland with the United 
Kingdom in a post-Brexit world. Therefore, it is evident that Iceland has not yet secured 
shelter of  a type comparable with what it used to receive from the US and thus it keeps 
searching for a shelter provider. 
According to the shelter theory, small states need shelter in order to survive and 
prosper. The Nordic states lack the economic and political resources to provide Iceland 
with comprehensive shelter, but they do continue to provide it with important partial 
shelter. Close relations with Russia and China may involve important shelter elements 
in terms of  economic benefits but these states’ authoritarian rule does not make them 
appealing shelter providers to small states. They are also not ideal partners for small 
democratic states seeking political shelter, where governance is based on the rule of  law 
and respect for human rights. Policy-makers in Iceland must consider carefully consider 
whether Russia and China are attractive allies for them, especially weighing the evidence 
of  their lack of  respect for democracy and human rights.
There are costs related to close shelter relations, such as the partial shelter that Ice-
land has gained through its membership of  the EEA; membership of  the EU would 
also entail costs. Moreover, the wide-ranging shelter provided by the US in the post-war 
years included costly elements, such as severe domestic disputes and a rift arising from 
the countries’ relations. Furthermore, a small state in a need of  shelter must be aware 
of  the fact that the shelter provider may not be willing to help in a time of  crisis and 
may even partially or fully withdraw its support. Accordingly, it must develop some basic 
domestic expertise, be prepared to seek other shelter alternatives, and be careful not to 
close any doors in that respect, if  possible.  
Importantly, the US desertion of  Iceland illustrates the risk associated with a small 
state’s dependence on shelter provided by a single shelter provider. The traditional Inter-
national Relations literature underestimates the role of  multilateral organizations, such 
as the Nordic Council and the European Union, in providing political and economic 
shelter to small states. Benefits of  close encounters between small states and multilat-
eral organizations may not be as noticeable as the advantages of  close shelter relations 
with a large neighbouring state. For instance, the benefits that Iceland derived from the 
political and economic shelter provided by the US were more conspicuous, and received 
much greater attention from the public, politicians, and academics than the shelter pro-
vided as a result of  Nordic cooperation and membership of  NATO, EFTA, EEA, and 
Schengen. 
Small states may receive more reliable shelter provided by a multilateral organization 
than provided by a single shelter provider. There is a greater risk of  a single shelter pro-
vider backing out from the shelter relationship than there is of  a multilateral organiza-
tion doing something similar. Risk is shared and spread in multilateral fora and members 
often operate according to set rules based on mutual assistance to other members in 
times of  need. Accordingly, multilateral fora bind larger states to helping out their smaller 
partners. Large states will have greater difficulties backing down from their commitments 
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Policy-makers in Iceland need to consider whether membership of  multilateral or-
ganizations provides a more stable shelter in order to reduce risk in the face of  a crisis 
event, assistance during a crisis situation, and help in cleaning up in the wake of  a crisis, 
according to the shelter theory. They must closely examine the extent to which multi-
lateral shelter arrangements (such as membership of  NATO, Schengen, the EEA, the 
EU, and the Nordic Council) may be more reliable providers of  shelter in times of  need, 
than a single protector, such as the USA or the UK.
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